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WORKERS ACCOMMODATE  
 
orkers have been accommodating co-workers since long before 
human rights codes made it a legal requirement.  We often 
make allowances for someone who has a bad back, is upset by 
family problems or is the worse for wear after a night out, and we expect our 
colleagues to do the same for us. 
 But, accommodation also developed as a legal obligation, based on 
federal and provincial human rights legislation and Supreme Court of Canada 
decisions from the mid 1980s on.  This legal workplace duty to accommodate 
requires the elimination of employment standards, rules, practices or other 
requirements that discriminate on prohibited grounds. 
 There are approximately a dozen prohibited grounds for discrimination 
under human rights legislation; the number varies with jurisdiction.  But 
accommodation is usually associated with cases of discrimination on the grounds 
of disability, (including physical and mental disability, and drug or alcohol 
addiction,) religion, sex (including pregnancy), race and family status. 
 As accommodation law has developed, tensions have emerged for 
unionists and other workers.  This examination of accommodation cases clarifies 
some of these tensions.  
 
WHO IS NORMAL? 
 
 Two 1999 Supreme Court of Canada cases, Meiorin (gender 
discrimination at the workplace) and Grismer (service discrimination to a person 
with a disability) radically changed our understanding of the legal duty to 
accommodate, and of who is to be considered normal. 
 Meiorin and Grismer established that accommodation is to be the norm.  
Equality and accommodation must be integral parts of all workplace rules and 
practices. This is in line with affirmative action and employment equity work 
that unions have been promoting for years. 
  
W
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The Meiorin decision requires employers to design workplace standards that do 
not discriminate: 
 
 By enacting human rights statutes and providing they are applicable to the 
 workplace, the legislatures have determined that the standards governing the 
 performance of work should be designed to reflect all members of society, in 
 so far as is reasonably possible. 
 
This touches tensions around workplaces where only men, or the able-bodied, or 
certain religious beliefs are considered the norm.  Meiorin deals with a woman in 
a traditionally male job. 
 Tawney Meiorin had been a forest fire fighter for three years when the BC 
government introduced new fitness tests.  She failed one of the four tests; she 
took 11:49.4 minutes to complete a 2.5 kilometre run, 49.4 seconds too slow, and 
was dismissed. 
 An arbitrator found that the aerobic capacity the run supposedly 
measured discriminated against women; there was no evidence this aerobic 
capacity was necessary for firefighters of either sex to work safely and 
effectively.  He ordered reinstatement.  The case wound its way to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
 The court developed the three-step Meiorin Test to determine if the 
employer has established a standard that is a bona fide occupational requirement. 
(The term bona fide occupational qualification and the abbreviations BFOR and 
BFOQ are also used.) 
 
The employer must: 
 
1. Demonstrate the standard was adopted for a purpose rationally 
connected to the performance of the job; 
2. honestly believe the standard is necessary to fulfill the legitimate, work-
related purpose; and 
3. show the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the 
legitimate, work-related purpose, so must demonstrate it is impossible to 
accommodate workers without undue hardship to the employer. 
 
To deal with step 3, the following questions are asked: 
 
• Have alternatives been considered? 
• If so, and they meet the employer’s needs, why were these alternatives 
not adopted? 
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• Must all workers meet a single standard, or could different standards be 
adopted? 
• Does the standard treat some more harshly than others? 
• If so, was the standard designed to minimize this differential treatment? 
• What steps were taken to find accommodations? 
• Is there evidence of undue hardship if accommodation were to be 
provided? 
• Have all parties who are required to accommodate played their roles? 
 
 The Meiorin Test was applied in Grismer.  Terry Grismer developed 
homonymous hemianopia.  It eliminated his left-side peripheral vision.  He 
constructed a system of mirrors to compensate for his vision loss when driving, 
but had his driver’s license cancelled anyway because he did not have 120° 
vision when given the standard examination.  The Supreme Court applied the 
Meiorin Test.  They found Grismer was discriminated against because he was not 
allowed to take an individual assessment, using his mirrors, to show he could 
drive safely. 
 The court in Meiorin did say accommodation would be the norm “in so 
far as is reasonably possible”.  Accommodation is not required if it causes undue 
hardship. 
  
HOW HARD IS “UNDUE HARDSHIP”? 
 
 The degree of hardship in undue hardship is high.  MacNeill says: 
“overall, the balance of case law characterizes undue hardship as an onerous 
standard”.  
 The federal Canadian Human Rights Act identifies only cost and health and 
safety.  To be considered undue hardship, financial costs must be so great as to 
alter the essential nature of the enterprise or affect its viability.  And, the 
availability of outside funding, (e.g., government programmes for retrofitting 
buildings,) must be considered. 
 In practice most workplace accommodations are not very expensive.  The 
Ontario Human Rights Commission says: “Over two-thirds of job 
accommodations cost under $500; many cost nothing at all”. 
 
UNDUE HARDSHIP AND HEALTH AND SAFETY 
 
 Health and safety includes the health and safety of the worker, the public 
and co-workers.  Considerations include: the degree of risk that will exist after 
accommodation has been made, the magnitude of the risk, who bears the risk 
and whether the risk outweighs the benefits of the accommodation. 
 In Pannu, the recaust operator in a mill had to shut down the plant during 
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gas leaks.  The employer’s regulations required the operator to be clean-shaven, 
because of the requirement to wear a mask during this procedure.  Mr. Pannu, a 
Sikh, could not comply for religious reasons, so lost his position. 
 The employer had tested Mr. Pannu to see if he could wear the mask with 
his beard, but expert advice indicated this was unsafe.  The tribunal considered 
training a replacement, but found it an undue hardship because it would be 
costly and potentially confusing in an emergency. 
 
ARE THERE OTHER KINDS OF UNDUE HARDSHIP? 
 
 In jurisdictions where undue hardship is not defined in the legislation 
(e.g. British Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec,) the courts may accept more factors 
than those specified in the Canadian Human Rights Act.  Following Central Alberta 
Dairy Pool, they may include: financial cost, health and safety, impact on the 
collective agreement, interference with other workers’ rights, employee morale, 
the size of the operation and the adaptability of the workforce and facilities. 
 World Wide Church of God member Jim Christie’s religious beliefs 
prevented him from working certain holy days. In 1983 he requested an unpaid 
leave of absence for Easter Monday.  He had been granted this in the past.  This 
time his request was denied.  He took the day off anyway, and was fired. 
 The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with Christie’s employer, the 
Central Alberta Dairy Pool, that the rule about being at work on Mondays was a 
bona fide occupational requirement.  Even so, the employer was guilty of adverse 
affect discrimination because the rule indirectly infringed on Mr. Christie’s 
religious beliefs and the court felt that accommodating him would not have 
constituted undue hardship. 
 Tensions can arise when workers seeking accommodation are not 
required to perform certain parts of a job or are able to avoid less desirable shifts 
and fellow workers have to pick up the slack.  This can be especially difficult if 
the duties are considered unpleasant or onerous. O’Malley provides another 
example. 
 Theresa O’Malley was a full time sales clerk at Simpson Sears.  When she 
became a Seventh Day Adventist her need to observe the Sabbath, which 
involved no work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, conflicted with 
the store’s requirement that she work Saturday shifts. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada decided that an employment rule, even if 
made in good faith for sensible business reasons, could result in adverse affect 
discrimination.  They decided the employer could have accommodated Ms. 
O’Malley without undue hardship by changing her shift schedule, so ruled in her 
favour , and stated:  
 
 An employment rule honestly made for sound economic or business reasons, 
 equally applicable to all to whom it is intended to apply, may yet be  
 discriminatory if it affects a person or group of persons differently from others 
 to whom it may apply. 
 
The court established three rules for these situations: 
 
1. In adverse affect discrimination cases, the employer must make reasonable 
efforts to accommodate, up to undue hardship. 
2. The employer cannot be expected to do more, if the problem is not resolved 
after these reasonable efforts have been made. 
3. Complainants must show they are experiencing discrimination because of a 
rule.  If this prima facie case is made, the employer must show that reasonable 
attempts were made to accommodate up to undue hardship. 
 
CAN ACCOMMODATION OVERRIDE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
PROVISIONS? 
 
 Naturally, unionists are keen to protect collective agreement provisions.  
But human rights legislation is “not quite constitutional but certainly more than 
the ordinary” (O’Malley) and can trump the collective agreement. 
 Larry Renaud, a Seventh Day Adventist, was an Okanagan School Board 
custodian.  His religious beliefs prevented him from working from sundown 
Friday evening to sundown Saturday.  But, the collective agreement between 
CUPE local 523 and the board required that he work Friday from 3 pm to 11 pm.  
Because no agreement could be reached to accommodate him, Mr. Renaud was 
let go.  
 The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the school board and union 
both had a duty to accommodate Mr. Renaud.  The school board said it had not 
accommodated Mr. Renaud because it wanted to avoid violating the collective 
agreement and having a grievance filed against it.  The court said it is relevant to 
review a collective agreement, to see what hardship might be involved in 
violating its terms.  But, a grievance in this case would not constitute undue 
hardship.  Anyway, such a grievance would not be successful because unions 
and employers cannot contract out of human rights law.  The court also said that 
objections to an accommodation from other workers could be considered when 
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determining hardship. 
 The union argued an employer should exhaust all reasonable 
accommodations that do not contravene the collective agreement, before 
adopting accommodation measures that violate it.  The court disagreed.  They 
said the most reasonable accommodation might be one that required union 
approval for a change in the collective agreement, as in Renaud. 
 The court decided unanimously that the employer and the union 
discriminated against Larry Renaud by failing to accommodate his religious 
beliefs. 
 The violation of a collective agreement, might, but does not necessarily, 
constitute undue hardship.  In this case, the fact that other workers would have 
to work Saturday slightly more often, to accommodate Mr. Renaud, was not 
deemed undue hardship. 
 But, worker objections could constitute undue hardship.  “The objection 
of employees based on well-grounded concerns that their rights will be affected 
must be considered.  On the other hand, objections based on attitudes 
inconsistent with human rights are an irrelevant consideration” (CUPW v. 
Canada Post Corporation). 
 
ACCOMODATION AND SENIORITY 
 
 Seniority and job security provisions are, in part, traditional ways that 
unions accommodate.  As workers age they tend to lose their strength and 
health, but in unionized workplaces they accumulate seniority.  So, it is not the 
young, healthy and strong who get first chance at a job.  Senior workers get first 
refusal on the “good” jobs, often the ones that are less physically demanding or 
taxing in other ways. 
 But, “where seniority acts as a wall rather than an equity enhancement – 
such as in cases of separate seniority lists within the same collective agreement – 
then it may very well be found to be a discriminating barrier”  (Lynk). 
 The few cases on seniority and accommodation that have been heard 
indicate that accommodation requirements can trump seniority provisions. 
 Lise Goyette and Nicole Tourville were telephone agents in a primarily 
female department.  The departmental seniority system prevented them from 
moving into male-dominated ticket office jobs, because they could not 
accumulate enough hours in the other department.  Following a Human Rights 
Commission employee’s recommendation, a straight seniority system was 
adopted.  This caused problems because workers could be bumped by people 
from other departments.  Lay-offs were announced.  Tensions mounted.  The 
union members voted to readopt the original departmental system. This meant 
male workers with less straight seniority qualified for ticket office jobs over 
female telephone agents with more straight seniority. 
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 A tribunal ruled the union had committed systemic discrimination 
against the female-dominated operators.  They assessed damages for hurt 
feelings and loss of salary and benefits.  The seniority system was modified to 
comply with the statute in the next round of negotiations. 
 In Greater Niagara Regional Hospital a registered practical nurse with back 
problems was accommodated in the clerical bargaining unit.  The clerical union 
did not object to the appointment, but challenged the fact she brought over her 
full nursing seniority.  This was especially problematic because lay-offs were in 
the wind.  The arbitration board, based on Renaud, found this was “significant 
interference” in the rights of clerical bargaining unit members and ruled in 
favour of the clerical union. 
 Case law suggests it is acceptable for a junior worker seeking 
accommodation to jump ahead of more senior workers when a vacancy is 
posted, provided no alternative accommodation possibilities exist.  But, 
incumbents cannot be removed from their current job to accommodate someone.  
For example, disabled workers returning to work after an absence cannot bump 
other employees out of their jobs. 
 
RETURN TO WORK 
 
 However, one of the most common sources of tension around 
accommodation is the return to work of a worker with a disability.  Up to four 
possibilities must be considered: 
 
Can the worker perform: 
 
• The existing job without modification? 
• The existing job with modification? 
• Another job without modification? 
• Another job with modification? 
 
 Workers must be able to perform the essential duties of the positions they 
are assigned, but the employer must be willing to adjust the workplace, unless it 
causes undue hardship, to make this possible.  Adjustments include: physical 
adaptation of the workplace, elimination of non-essential duties, obtaining help 
from other workers and changing schedules. 
 Unions often have to press the employer to be diligent in accommodating 
a returning employee.  Tensions also arise when unions have to balance the 
interests of a returning worker against those of other members who may have to 
adjust to facilitate the accommodation. 
 An accommodated worker must perform useful, productive work.  But, 
when a worker is returning to work with modified duties, it is acceptable, during 
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the first stages of the “work hardening process”, if that person is not of much 
short-term economic benefit. 
 
DOES THE UNION HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE 
ACCOMODATION? 
 
 The employer is primarily responsible for ensuring accommodation, but 
unions sometimes share the responsibility.  In Renaud the Supreme Court said a 
union could become liable for discrimination in two ways – causing or 
contributing to discrimination in the first place or impeding the employer’s 
efforts to accommodate.  If a union fails to correct a discriminatory collective 
agreement it becomes liable for the effects of discrimination and may have to pay 
damages. 
 Gohm was one of several cases where the collective agreement failed to 
accommodate a Seventh Day Adventist’s need to observe the Sabbath.  The 
union would not agree to modify the collective agreement, and was found jointly 
liable with the employer. 
 However, a union may be exonerated if it has tried to amend a 
discriminatory clause.  In Thompson v. Fleetwood Ambulance the collective 
agreement reduced vacation entitlement for every full month a worker was 
absent.  This discriminated against workers with disabilities.  The union showed 
that over several rounds of negotiations it had tried to have the provision 
changed, so was cleared of liability.  
 The union has a duty to represent the best interests of all its members.  It 
may question proposed accommodations that help one or more members, but 
could hurt the rights of others.  It can propose alternative accommodation 
solutions that are less hard for the membership, but it cannot contract out of 
human rights law. 
 Even individual union officers may be liable if they support 
discriminatory provisions during bargaining.  In O’Sullivan v. Amcon an Ontario 
Board of Inquiry said a union officer who supports a discriminatory clause 
during negotiations may be personally in breach of the statute. 
 
HOW CAN WE REDUCE TENSIONS AROUND ACCOMODATION? 
 
 Unions may use complementary approaches to reduce tensions and 
minimize problems around accommodation. 
 
A)  AUDIT THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT  
 
 An audit of the collective agreement reduces the likelihood of difficulties 
arising in the first place. The agreement should explicitly prohibit discrimination.  
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It should deal specifically with accommodation and specify that workers with a 
disability may perform available bargaining unit work.  It should be clear what 
collective agreement rights workers retain if available work is broader than work 
in their original bargaining unit.  
 The agreement should include adequate definitions.  For example, 
“disability” should be defined broadly enough to include temporary disability. 
 To correct any problems unions need to negotiate contract provisions that 
foster inclusive and barrier-free workplaces.  This reduces the need to regulate 
specific problems, reduces the likelihood that individuals who require 
accommodation will be scapegoated, and reduces the chance of other workers 
resenting the “special treatment” extended to people who require 
accommodation. 
 
B)  REVIEW ACCOMODATION PROCEDURES 
 
 Unions should check the procedures used to solve accommodation 
problems at the workplace. If it is employer policy, does it meet all members’ 
needs? Are union leaders, stewards and the general membership familiar with its 
provisions? 
 If accommodation provisions are in the collective agreement and if union 
and management run some procedures jointly, are the rights of members to 
grieve and go to arbitration fully protected? 
 
Does the procedure: 
 
• Identify clearly what accommodation is required? 
• Identify positions that could be used for accommodation? 
• Include the possibility of training as part of accommodation? 
• Provide for permanent accommodation, temporary accommodation and 
work-hardening measures?  
• Provide for adequate severance provisions if accommodation cannot be 
provided short of undue hardship? 
 
Many tensions centre on the provision of medical information.  Unions should 
ensure that it is clear: 
 
• Under what circumstances medical information is required; 
• whose doctor (the worker’s or the employer’s) will provide the 
information; 
• who pays for medical opinions;  
• if the employer can require medical examinations; and  
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• whether the worker has access to all results 
 
EDUCATION 
 
 Finally, many of the tensions that arise around accommodation result 
from a lack of information and understanding.  Unions must educate their 
leaders, stewards and grass roots members on accommodation: What is the 
union position?  What does the law say?  How should different accommodation 
issues be handled?  Why it is important to protect the rights of workers who 
need accommodation?  How can other workers facilitate accommodation? 
 Workers realize that a misfortune which has visited a colleague might 
one day visit them.  This is the starting point for developing a firm union 
position on the duty to accommodate. 
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